Houthis Bab el-Mandeb coverage has materially expanded again. Associated Press now reports that Houthi forces have seized Greater Hanish and Lesser Hanish in the southern Red Sea after earlier gains at Mokha and Mayun/Perim.
The new island captures extend the reported Houthi territorial footprint around the southern Red Sea shipping system. They increase the strategic and operational risk facing commercial shipping, but they still do not establish that Bab el-Mandeb itself is fully closed.
Current status: current reporting places the Houthis at Mokha, Mayun/Perim and now Greater and Lesser Hanish. That gives the group a broader physical position around the southern Red Sea and the approaches to Bab el-Mandeb. MARAD continues to treat the area as a high-risk commercial-shipping environment, but the reviewed official guidance does not announce a complete closure of the strait.
What changed with the Hanish Islands?
Associated Press reports that Houthi forces have seized the strategic islands of Greater Hanish and Lesser Hanish. These gains follow the earlier reported captures of Mokha on Yemen’s Red Sea coast and Mayun, also known as Perim, inside the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint.
The significance is geographical as well as military. Mayun sits inside Bab el-Mandeb, while the Hanish group lies farther north in the southern Red Sea. Taken together, the reported gains extend the Houthi-controlled or Houthi-held footprint across more of the maritime space surrounding the route rather than concentrating the story only at one island or one port.
Does the Hanish capture mean Bab el-Mandeb is closed?
No full closure is established by the evidence reviewed for this article.
The U.S. Maritime Administration continues to warn that Houthis pose a threat to commercial vessels transiting the southern Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden. Its current advisory describes risks including missiles, drones, small-boat attacks, illegal boarding and vessel seizure, while continuing to provide transit and security guidance rather than declaring the route completely closed.
Territorial control, military leverage and navigational closure are different states. A force can hold strategically important islands and coastline, increase surveillance or attack capability and influence carrier decisions without physically stopping every commercial transit.
Why Greater and Lesser Hanish matter
The Hanish islands sit in the southern Red Sea north of Bab el-Mandeb. Their location makes them relevant to the wider security environment through which ships approach or leave the chokepoint.
Control of the islands can potentially improve a force’s observation, basing or threat position in surrounding waters. However, the exact military systems present on the islands, their operational readiness and their direct effect on commercial vessel movement are not fully established in the public evidence reviewed by TPS.
The responsible conclusion is therefore that the Hanish captures increase strategic leverage and maritime uncertainty, not that they automatically create an enforceable blockade.
How does this differ from the Mayun capture?
Mayun/Perim has a particularly direct relationship with Bab el-Mandeb because the island sits within the strait and separates navigable channels. Its reported capture changed the immediate geography of the chokepoint.
Greater and Lesser Hanish extend the territorial story farther north into the southern Red Sea. That broadens the area in which commercial operators must assess Houthi-controlled positions and regional conflict risk.
The newer Hanish state therefore strengthens the same underlying reader problem rather than creating a separate article: how far the territorial advance changes operational shipping risk without confusing territorial gains with a confirmed route closure.
Why Mokha still matters
Mokha remains important because it is a Red Sea coastal position close to Bab el-Mandeb. Reported Houthi control there, combined with Mayun and the Hanish islands, means the group’s recent territorial gains now span coastal and island positions relevant to the wider southern Red Sea maritime environment.
That wider footprint can matter to route planning, security assessments, insurance decisions and carrier risk tolerance even if commercial vessels continue to transit.
What does current MARAD guidance say?
MARAD’s active advisory for the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and Somali Basin says the Houthis continue to pose a threat to commercial vessels in the region.
The advisory tells U.S.-flagged commercial vessels to maintain heightened vigilance, consider AIS-related security risks, follow current maritime reporting procedures and prepare for hostile actions including drones, missiles, small craft and illegal boardings.
It also tells vessels that receive Houthi or purported Yemeni-authority instructions to divert, activate AIS or provide voyage information not to follow those directions when safe passage can continue. That is materially different from an official declaration that Bab el-Mandeb has been shut to commercial traffic.
Are commercial ships still able to use the route?
The reviewed evidence does not establish that all commercial passage has stopped. The current state remains one of exceptionally high security risk, selective carrier avoidance and changing operational decisions rather than a verified universal closure.
Individual operators may choose to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope or alter transit procedures because of company security policy, vessel profile, insurance conditions or current intelligence. Those company decisions should not be converted into a claim that the entire strait is legally or physically closed.
What does the Houthi advance not prove?
- It does not prove every navigable channel through Bab el-Mandeb is blocked.
- It does not prove all commercial vessels have stopped transiting the Red Sea corridor.
- It does not establish that every carrier has adopted the same routing policy.
- It does not establish the exact weapons, surveillance systems or maritime capabilities now deployed on the Hanish islands.
- It does not by itself prove a specific freight-rate, insurance-premium, oil-price or India import-cost increase.
- It does not make Houthi statements about navigation an independent safety guarantee for commercial operators.
What should shipping and trade readers watch next?
The most important next evidence remains operational:
- a new MARAD or UKMTO advisory;
- a confirmed vessel attack, boarding or seizure near Bab el-Mandeb or the Hanish islands;
- an explicit navigation restriction or closure notice;
- major carrier suspension, return or rerouting decisions;
- insurance or maritime-security reclassification;
- deployment of identifiable military systems on the newly captured islands; or
- a counteroffensive that changes control of Mokha, Mayun or the Hanish group.
MARAD’s current advisory is scheduled to expire on September 22, 2026 unless it is replaced, extended or superseded earlier. That creates a clear next official checkpoint for the commercial-shipping risk state.
Verification method
ThePulseSignal compared current Associated Press reporting on the reported capture of Greater and Lesser Hanish with current reporting on Mokha and Mayun/Perim and the active U.S. MARAD commercial-shipping advisory for the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb region.
The territorial expansion is treated as strongly reported rather than upgraded to a complete primary-source territorial record. The maritime conclusion remains narrower: the reviewed evidence supports heightened and geographically expanded shipping risk but does not establish that Bab el-Mandeb is fully closed.
Limitations and unresolved facts
- A complete public primary territorial statement independently listing Mokha, Mayun, Greater Hanish and Lesser Hanish was not recovered.
- The durability of Houthi control over the newly reported island positions remains subject to the conflict.
- The exact military assets deployed on Greater and Lesser Hanish are not established in the reviewed evidence.
- Carrier and insurer responses can change independently and may differ by vessel or company.
- A high-risk maritime environment does not itself prove a complete navigational closure.
Bottom line: the reported Houthi advance now extends beyond Mokha and Mayun/Perim to Greater and Lesser Hanish. That materially broadens the group’s strategic position in the southern Red Sea, but current maritime evidence still does not establish that Bab el-Mandeb is fully closed.
Last verified: September 14, 2026.
